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Abstract. Current techniques for security analysis of administrative
role-based access control (ARBAC) policies restrict themselves to the
separate administration assumption that essentially separates adminis-
trative roles from regular ones. The naive algorithm of tracking all users
is all that is known for the security analysis of ARBAC policies without
separate administration, and the state space explosion that this results
in precludes building eﬀective tools. In contrast, the separate administra-
tion assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis since it makes it suﬃcient
to track only one user at a time. However, separation limits the expres-
siveness of the models and restricts modeling distributed administrative
control. In this paper, we undertake a fundamental study of analysis
of ARBAC policies without the separate administration restriction, and
show that analysis algorithms can be built that track only a bounded
number of users, where the bound depends only on the number of ad-
ministrative roles in the system. Using this fundamental insight paves the
way for us to design an involved heuristic to further tame the state space
explosion in practical systems. Our results are also very eﬀective when
applied on policies designed under the separate administration restric-
tion. We implement our techniques and report on experiments conducted
on several realistic case studies.
1 Introduction
Role-based access control (RBAC) has emerged in recent years as a simple and
eﬀective access control mechanism for large organizations [6, 17]. RBAC is the
most popular model for large organizations [15, 1] and can implement a variety
of MAC and DAC policies. RBAC is also a popular mechanism in assigning user
privileges in computer systems, and is supported in several systems including
Microsoft SQL Servers [2], Microsoft Active Directory (AGDLP) [3], SELinux,
and Oracle DBMS. It simpliﬁes policy speciﬁcation and the management of user
rights using a two tier management— it groups users into roles and assigns per-
missions to each role. In any organization, roles can be associated with job func-
tions and hence role-permission assignments are relatively stable, while user-role
assignments change quite frequently (e.g., personnel moving across departments,
reassignment of duties, etc.). Managing the user-role permissions is signiﬁcantly
easier than managing user rights individually.
Administrative role-based access control (ARBAC) [16, 18] is a policy mech-
anism for controlling how changes can be made to the RBAC policy by variousadministrators. ARBAC policies are generally composed of three sub-policies:
one controlling user-role assignment (URA), one controlling permission-role as-
signment (PRA), and one dealing with role-role assignments (RRA). A set of
administrative roles is deﬁned, users are assigned administrative roles, and a
URA mechanism speciﬁes when a user in an administrative role can grant or
revoke role-assignments to users, including administrative roles as well. (PRA
and RRA mechanisms are less common; we will not consider them in this paper.)
Security analysis of ARBAC systems is recognized as an extremely impor-
tant problem, as an analysis tool can help designers to determine whether their
policies meet required security properties. The developers of the administrative
systems have an intended security goal that they want to enforce through the
policy, and they set up the roles and administrative rules (formalized in AR-
BAC) to realize these intentions. Even though ARBAC policies are speciﬁed
using simple administrative rules that intuitively meet the designers’ intentions,
it is often very diﬃcult to ﬁnd out subtle behaviours, yielding security breaches.
This happens mainly because it is hard to foresee the whole eﬀect of multiple
administrative changes and their interaction. Security breaches include privilege
escalation (e.g. an employee of a lower rank gaining access to resources meant
for a higher rank), violation of separation of duty constraints that model conﬂict
of interest (e.g., a user u simultaneously holding roles r1 and r2), etc.
In most cases the security analysis problem for ARBAC system can be
phrased as a role-reachability problem: given a set of users, can any user in
this set gain access to a given role goal using the ARBAC policy rules? Such
a technical problem seems to be the most useful security question for ARBAC
systems. Indeed, almost all interesting security questions can be reduced to the
above problem (see [10, 22, 4]). Unfortunately, it is very hard to verify security
of ARBAC policies precisely. The main source of complexity is that simulating
the system to examine the entire set of reachable states causes an explosion
in state-space, as it requires tracking all users’ role-memberships. In a system
with |U| users and |R| roles, this means exploring O((2|R|)|U|) conﬁgurations,
in the worst case! If the number of users is very small, this can be achieved
in practice using model-checking techniques that use symbolic representations
of state-spaces (like BDDs), but any realistic scenario would involve thousands
of users, making this completely intractable. For those reasons researchers have
turned to consider either restricted scenarios or abstraction techniques [22, 9, 4].
One crucial assumption that has been used to tackle the above problem is
that of separate administration [22]. This essentially assumes that administra-
tive roles and regular roles are disjoint so that administrative operations only
aﬀect regular roles and assignment/revocation of administrative permissions are
not considered. Such a restriction greatly simpliﬁes the analysis since is then
suﬃcient to consider only the evolution of a single user (at a time) as opposed
to tracking all users. On the other hand, the separate administration restric-
tion severely limits the expressiveness of the model [22] and precludes the use
of frameworks such as SARBAC [5], UARBAC [13] and Oracle which do not
assume such a limitation. In particular, the separate administration restrictionis increasingly inappropriate in a world where administration is getting more
and more distributed. For example, users belonging to regular roles in modern
organizations are often administrators of several resources and have the right to
grant administrative privileges to other users on these resources (e.g., a user may
have administrative powers over access to their rooms, their ﬁles, etc., and have
the ability to allow administrative access to other users for these resources). In
such situations, it is important that administrative permissions are allowed to
be granted and revoked. The separate administration restriction precludes the
modeling of such scenarios.
Beyond separate administration: While much research has considered the
separate administration model, the naive algorithm of tracking all users is all
that is known for the security analysis of ARBAC policies without separate ad-
ministration, and the state space explosion that this results in precludes building
eﬀective tools. The only relevant work here that we know of is recent work by
Ferrara et al [4] that proposes using abstractions techniques; however, while this
is eﬀective in proving correct policies correct, it is not precise and in particular
cannot generate attacks when the abstraction fails to prove safety.
Several basic questions of security analysis for policies without separate ad-
ministration are still open: Does an analysis of these policies necessarily have to
track all users? The RBAC model provides a layer of abstraction where users
in a system are grouped together into roles; can this be exploited to perform
an analysis that is completely independent of the number of users in the sys-
tem (but dependent on the number of roles)? Finally, can security analysis for
ARBAC be made scalable, given that multiple users may need to be tracked?
The goal of this paper is to answer fundamental theoretical questions on the
security analysis of general ARBAC systems, and exploiting the insights gained,
provide scalable tools to analyze expressive ARBAC policies.
As a ﬁrst contribution, we show that the security analysis of ARBAC
systems can be achieved completely independent of the number of users. More
precisely, we show that the number of users that an analysis needs to track si-
multaneously depends only on the number of administrative roles (k), and, in
fact, it is always suﬃcient to track k+1 users simultaneously. The proof of the
theorem is quite non-trivial; a user u may reach a target role just using the
administrators currently in the system (in which case, tracking one user would
suﬃce). However, users in certain administrative roles may not exist and the
system can evolve to drop administrative privileges of users; further the user
u may collude with a subset of users, who could become administrators of the
right kind and help the user u reach the target role. (When administrators are
computer programs that automatically evolve, as is common in some scenarios,
this does not even mean collusion, and is just exploitation of these software ad-
ministrators). The fundamental theorem we prove shows that, however complex
these collusions are, tracking k + 1 users always suﬃces.
The proof of the fundamental theorem leads to signiﬁcant insights on the
users that need to be tracked by an analysis. As a second contribution, we
utilize such insights in order to build a trimming procedure that takes as inputan ARBAC system with a target role, and reduces it to an often much smaller
ARBAC system, that has signiﬁcantly smaller sets of users, administrative roles,
and rules.
The eﬀectiveness of our procedure is ampliﬁed by an aggressive pruning algo-
rithm which we propose as our third contribution and whose applicability is of
independent interest (it is eﬀective also for separated administration scenarios).
Static pruning techniques have been previously proposed [10, 22, 4] in order to
reduce the state space to explore. The basic idea behind those techniques is that
of removing roles and administrative rules from the policies that are immaterial
to the reachability of role goal.
As a fourth contribution, we evaluate our techniques on the policies (with-
out separate assumption) in [19]— these systems are initially populated by thou-
sands of users and the naive precise solution known will track all users and would
fail pathetically. Our procedure signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the policies considered,
reducing the number of eﬀective users that need to be tracked to be very small
(often 3 to 4), which then leads us to solve the security problem for them. This
result is the ﬁrst we are aware of that shows that security analysis can be feasible
without separate administration restriction.
Moreover, we evaluate our aggressive pruning technique on the realistic poli-
cies and test cases considered in [9] (with separate assumption). These policies
are considered very complex to analyze given their huge number of roles and rules
ranging respectively from 600 to 40k and 1k to 200k. Only under-approximate
techniques have been found successful on those policies [9], which of course can
ﬁnd shallow errors but are not complete. We experimentally show that our prun-
ing technique, in contrast to ones known, is extremely eﬀective. Indeed, it reduces
most of the aforementioned complex policies to equivalent systems (in terms of
role-reachability) having as few roles (rules, resp.) as a single one.
Related Work. Besides the work already cited above, there are a few other
works that are related to this paper. Li and Tripunitara [14] have studied the
security analysis problem of ARBAC systems and identiﬁed fragments and re-
stricted queries that can be solved in polynomial time. Sasturkar et al [20] have
showed that the problem is Pspace-complete, that most restrictions still are
NP-hard, and some very restricted cases can be solved in polynomial time. Jha
et al. [10] compared the use of model checking and ﬁrst order logic program-
ming for the security analysis of ARBAC and concluded that model checking is
a promising approach for security analysis. Stoller et al [22] identify the ﬁxed-
parameter complexity of the problem, and show that the problem is tractable if
we ﬁx the number of roles. Their techniques are implemented in the RBAC-PAT
tool [7]. In more recent work, Stoller et al have extended the ARBAC model to
parameterized ARBAC that allows conditions that depend on parameters [21].
2 Preliminaries
Role Based Access Control. An RBAC policy is a tuple  U,R,P,UA,PA,≻ 
where U, R, and P are ﬁnite sets of users, roles, and permissions, respectively,UA ⊆ U × R is the user-role assignment relation, and PA ⊆ P × R is the
permission-role assignment relation. A pair (u,r) ∈ UA represents the member-
ship of user u to role r, and (p,r) ∈ PA means that role r has permission p.
Roles are related by a hierarchy relation deﬁned by the partial order ≻. The
hierarchy relation allows to inherit permissions by one role from another in the
hierarchy: for any two roles r,r′ ∈ R,r inherits all permissions of r′ whenever
r ≻ r′. However, in the rest of the paper we restrict ourself to consider only
RBAC policies with an empty hierarchy relation. From an analysis point of view
it is always possible to transform a hierarchical RBAC system into one without
hierarchy that preserves the reachability of its roles (see [20] for the description
of such a transformation). Furthermore, we concentrate our analysis on user-role
administration. Thus, in the rest of the paper we refer to an RBAC policy as a
tuple  U,R,UA .
Administrative Role Based Access Control. ARBAC policies [16, 18] de-
scribe a model for role-based administration of RBAC. They are composed of
three modules: URA user-role administration, PRA permission-role administra-
tion, and RRA role-role administration. In this paper we focus on the user-role
administration model which is of most practical interest. In practice user-role
membership changes are the most frequent [11] when compared with changes in
permission-role and role-role relationships. The URA policy describes how the
user-role assignment relation UA of an RBAC policy can be modiﬁed in the evo-
lution of the system. A central role is played by the set of administrative roles
AR: the users in AR (called administrators) can assign and/or revoke roles to
other users.
The assignment of a user to a role is subject to a precondition which depends
only on the user’s role-memberships. A precondition is a Boolean formula written
as a conjunction of literals, where each literal is either in positive form r or in
negative form ¬r, for some role r in R. To simplify the notation we represent
each precondition with two subsets Pos and Neg of R. The set Pos represents
the set of all roles the user must be in, as opposed to Neg which is the set of all
roles which the user must not belong to.
The permission to assign users to roles is speciﬁed by a set of tuples
can assign ⊆ AR × 2
R × 2
R × R.
The meaning of a can-assign tuple (admin,Pos,Neg,r) ∈ can assign is that a
member of the administrative role admin ∈ AR can assign a user whose current
role-membership satisﬁes the precondition (Pos,Neg) to the role r ∈ R. (In the
rest of the paper we always assume that Pos ∩ Neg = ∅).
Rules to remove users from roles are deﬁned by a set
can revoke ⊆ AR × R.
If (admin,r) ∈ can revoke then a member of the administrative role admin ∈
AR can revoke the membership of a user from role r (regardless the user role-
membership). In the rest of the paper we refer to an URA model as a pair
 can assign,can revoke .Separate Administration Restriction. Under the separate administration
restriction, the set of administrative roles will never appear as target of a can-
assign or can-revoke rule. In other words, it is intrinsically assumed that admin-
istrators will never change their membership to administrative roles. We relax
the separate administration restriction and allow administrative roles to be part
of the set of roles R, i.e., AR ⊆ R.
ARBAC Systems. In this section we describe ARBAC systems as state-transi-
tion systems, and deﬁne the role-reachability problem for them. An ARBAC sys-
tem is a tuple S =  U,R, UA, can assign, can revoke  where  U,R,UA  is an
RBAC policy and  can assign,can revoke  is an URA model over the set of roles
R. A conﬁguration of S is any user-role assignment relation UR ⊆ U ×R. A con-
ﬁguration UR is initial if UR = UA. Given two S conﬁgurations UR and UR
′,
there is a transition from UR to UR
′ with rule m ∈ (can assign ∪ can revoke),
denoted UR
m − → UR
′, if there is an administrator ad and an administrative role
admin with (ad,admin) ∈ UR and a user u ∈ U, and one of the following holds:
[can-assign move] m = (admin,P,N,r), P ⊆ {t|(u,t) ∈ UR}, N ⊆ R \
{t|(u,t) ∈ UR}, and UR
′ = UR ∪ {(u,r)};
[can-revoke move] m = (admin,r), (u,r) ∈ UR, and UR
′ = UR \ {(u,r)}.
A run of S is any ﬁnite sequence of S transitions π = c1
m1 − − → c2
m2 − − → ...cn
mn − − →
cn+1 for some n ≥ 0, where c1 is an initial conﬁguration of S. An S conﬁguration
c is reachable if c is the last conﬁguration of an S run.
Deﬁnition 1 (Role-reachability Problem). For any role r ∈ R, r is reach-
able in S if there is an S reachable conﬁguration UR such that (u,r) ∈ UR, for
some u ∈ U. Given an ARBAC system S over the set of roles R and a role
goal ∈ R, the role-reachability problem asks whether goal is reachable in S.
3 Bounding the Number of Users to Track
In this section we show that the role-reachability problem for ARBAC is solvable
by tracking at most k + 1 users, where k is the number of administrative roles.
Theorem 1. Let S =  U,R, UA, can assign, can revoke  be an ARBAC system
with k administrative roles. If a role goal ∈ R is reachable in S then there exists
a run of S in which goal is reachable and at most k + 1 users change their
role-combination.
Proof. For any run π = c1
m1 − − → c2
m2 − − → ...cn
mn − − → cn+1 of S, we denote with
ρ(π) = admin1, admin2, ..., adminn the sequence of administrative roles where
adminj is the administrative role used in the j’th transition of π, i.e., for every
j ∈ [1,n], either mj = (adminj,Pj,Nj,tj) or mj = (adminj,tj). A user u is
engaged in π iﬀ there exists at least a transition in π that changes the role-
combination of u. Moreover, u is essential in π if, u is engaged and for some
j ∈ [1,n], u is the only user in adminj in cj. We denote with indexπ(u) the
greatest j ∈ [1,n] such that u is the only user in role adminj in cj.
We now show that, for each run π of S in which role goal is reachable by
a user (say target), it is possible to construct another run π′ having at mostk +1 engaged users. We assume that target reaches role goal, for the ﬁrst time,
in the last conﬁguration of π. We obtain π′ from π by repeatedly applying the
following rules.
Simpliﬁcation rules: Let π0 = π, and πi be the run obtained after i steps.
1. If πi contains an engaged user, but target, which is not essential, then pick
one of them, say u, and remove from πi all transitions changing u’s role-
combination.
2. If all engaged users in πi are essential, then pick one of them, say u, such that
u  = target, and there is a transition mj changing u’s role-combination, where
j ≥ ℓ and ℓ = indexπi(u). Then, remove from πi all transitions changing u’s
role-combination after conﬁguration cℓ.
Notice that the simpliﬁcation process eventually terminates as we reduce the
length of the run at each step. Furthermore, a simpliﬁcation step always produces
a run provided πi is itself a run. The key observation to prove this property is
that we always guarantee to leave a user in any administrative role to ﬁre any
move in πi.
To conclude the proof, we show that any of such run π′ has at most k + 1
engaged users. Since each engaged user u in π′ (but target) is essential and no
transition changing u’s role-combination after cindexπ′(u) exists, it holds that for
any two distinct engaged users u1 and u2 in π′ (both diﬀerent from target),
adminj1  = adminj2, with j1 = indexπ′(u1) and j2 = indexπ′(u2). Thus, the
number of engaged users in π′ is at most equal to the number of administrative
roles in S plus one (that represents user target). ⊓ ⊔
4 Reducing the Number of Users to Track
Theorem 1 gives an upper-bound on the number of users to track to solve the
role-reachability problem. Although the number of users to engage is generally
much smaller than the number of users in the system, in practice even tracking
few users can be unfeasible, hence it is extremely desirable to reduce as much as
possible such a parameter. From a theoretical viewpoint such a bound is tight,
but it is unlikely that real world ARBAC instances incur such intricate worst
case scenarios. Thus, the main objective of this section is to devise new heuristics
to reduce the number of administrative roles, hence the number of users to track.
Our proposal is to provide suﬃcient conditions to eliminate administrative
roles. An administrative role is immaterial if there is a user that can belong to
that role forever without aﬀecting the reachability of any other role. In particular,
we ﬁrst identify two criteria for an administrative role to be immaterial; then we
transform the policy in such a way that immaterial administrative roles become
regular ones. For this purpose, we add to the system a fresh administrative
role, called super, and a new user whose role-membership is the sole role super.
The ﬁrst component of any assignment/revocation rule administrated by an
immaterial administrative role admin is replaced with super. This has the eﬀect
of making admin a regular role (i.e., a role without administrative permissions).
More formally, we transform all can-assign moves (admin,P,N,t) ∈ can assigninto (super,P,N,t), and similarly each can-revoke rule (admin,t) ∈ can revoke
into (super, t). We now present two suﬃcient conditions which lead to immaterial
administrative roles.
The ﬁrst suﬃcient condition for immaterial administrative role is as follows.
Let admin be an administrative role which does not appear in negative form in
any precondition, and that initially contains a user, say u. Since the removal of
u from admin will not allow to ﬁre more rules, we can impose that u will never
be removed from admin making it immaterial.
For the second condition we resort to Theorem 1. If there are at least k + 2
users sharing the same role-membership, we can think that one of them will not
be engaged in any run, making immaterial all administrative roles which those
users are member of. As a side note, it is safe to keep in the system at most
k + 1 users for each role-combination, the remaining ones which we denote as
spare users can be eliminated.
Notice that, the more users share the same role-combination the more the
second condition becomes eﬀective. Therefore, our approachbeneﬁts from the use
of any technique that may increase the number of users having the same role-
combination. For instance, we can employ pruning techniques that transform
a system in an equivalent one (in terms of the reachability of role goal) by
eliminating roles and rules. Pruning techniques have been ﬁrst introduced in [10]
and proved (in some case) useful to reduce the state-space to analyze [10, 22, 4].
Fig. 1 shows algorithm ReduceAdmin we
ReduceAdmin(S,goal)
b S
′ ← S;
do
b S ← b S
′;
b S
′ ← Pruning( b S
′, goal);
b S
′ ← Immaterial( b S
′ );
b S
′ ← Spare( b S
′ );
while ( b S  = b S
′);
return( b S
′ );
Fig.1. ReduceAdmin.
propose to eliminate the immaterial administra-
tive roles.
ReduceAdmin takes as input a pair (S, goal),
where S is an ARBAC system and goal is a role
of S for which we want to check the reachability.
ReduceAdmin returns an ARBAC systems b S′
that preserves the role-reachability of goal and
reduces the number of administrative roles ac-
cording to the two conditions for immaterial ad-
ministrative roles given above. We assume that
S has a special administrative role called super,
containing a user as described above.
The algorithm recursively executes a do-while loop until no further simpli-
ﬁcation of the system is possible. At each iteration, it ﬁrst executes a pruning
algorithm, that preserves the reachability of goal aimed at reducing the number
of roles and rules, and then it collapses all immaterial administrative roles into
the special role super. Finally, spare users are eliminated from the system. It is
easy to see that ReduceAdmin eventually terminates, as it shrinks the size of
the system at each loop iteration.
Theorem 2 (Correctness of ReduceAdmin). Let S be an ARBAC system
over the set of roles R, goal ∈ R, and S′ = ReduceAdmin (S, goal). Then, role
goal is reachable in S iﬀ it is reachable in S′.Our experiments (see Sec. 6), instantiate Pruning in the algorithm of Fig. 1
with a novel pruning algorithm that we present in Sec. 5.
5 Aggressive Pruning
In this section we describe a novel pruning algorithm, called aggressive pruning,
to eliminate roles and rules that are irrelevant to the reachability of role goal.
We extend previous proposals [10, 22, 4] by identifying six new pruning rules:
the ﬁrst three rules aim at discarding irrelevant roles while the remaining ones
identify assignment/revocation rules that can be combined or eliminated.
In the rest of the section we refer to S as an ARBAC system with a special
administrative role super which is never removed, and always contains a user
whose sole membership is in role super. Intuitively, super subsumes all admin-
istrative roles admin for which we can guarantee that it always contains some
user ready to perform a rule administered by admin. We denote as persistent all
rules administered by super. At each step in the computation we refer to b S =
 U,R,UA, can assign, can revoke  as the current pruned ARBAC system de-
rived from S. Below we introduce six pruning rules, called Ri, for i ∈ {1,...,6},
and denote with [[ b S]]i the ARBAC system resulting from the application of Ri
to b S. We now formally deﬁne them and argue their correctness.
Removing Irrelevant Roles. A non-administrative role r is irrelevant, if each
can-assign rule can be ﬁred with any user u, regardless of u’s membership to
r. An irrelevant role can be eliminated from the system without aﬀecting the
reachability of goal. The elimination of a set of roles X ⊆ R from b S implies the
following changes to the policy: (1) revoke all users-membership from each role
in X; (2) remove all assignment/revocation rules having a role in X as target;
(3) drop any role in X from each precondition of the remaining can-assign rules.
Formally, let Rua(UA,X) = UA\(U×X); Rca(can assign,X) = {(admin,P\
X,N\X,t)| (admin, P,N,t) ∈ can assign∧t / ∈ X)}; and Rcr(can revoke,X) =
can revoke \ (R × X). Removing the roles of X from b S results into the system
R( b S,X) =  U,R \ X, Rua(UA,X), Rca(can assign, X), Rcr(can revoke, X) .
We classify regular roles as non-negative, non-positive, and mixed. A role
r ∈ (R\AR) is non-positive (non-negative, resp.), if r does not appear in positive
(negative, resp.) form in the precondition of any can-assign rule; it is mixed if
it appears both in positive and negative form in some precondition. We now
identify suﬃcient conditions for a role (diﬀerent from role goal) to be irrelevant
in each of those categories.
Remove each regular role r ∈ (R \ {goal}) from b S such that
R1: r is non-positive and (super,r) ∈ can revoke;
R2: r is non-negative and for every (admin,P,N,t) ∈ can assign with r ∈ P,
there is (admin
′,P
′,N
′,r) ∈ can assign such that P
′ ⊆ P \ {r}, N
′ ⊆ N ∪ {t}, and
either admin
′ = admin or admin
′ = super;
R3: r is mixed and both R1and R2 hold.
Fig.2. Suﬃcient conditions to remove irrelevant roles.Non-Positive Roles. A non-positive role r is irrelevant if there is a persistent
can-revoke cr with target r. Indeed, since r is a non-positive role, a can-assign
ca could not be ﬁred with respect of a user u, only if r is in its precondition and
u belongs to r. However, the persistent can-revoke cr can be executed before
rule ca, thus enabling ca to be performed regardless of u’s membership in r.
We translate this property in the following pruning rule: remove the set X of
all non-positive roles such that for each r ∈ X, (super,r) ∈ can revoke. Then,
[[ b S]]1 = R( b S,X). This pruning rule is summarised in Fig. 2 as R1.
Non-Negative Roles. Let r be a non-negative role. A can-assign ca could not be
ﬁred with respect to a user u, only if r is in the precondition of ca and u does not
belong to r. However, if u can be assigned to r while satisfying the precondition of
ca (except for u’s membership to r), then the ca can be executed regardless of u’s
membership to r. We translate this property in the following rule: remove the set
X of all non-negative roles r such that, for every (admin,P,N,t) ∈ can assign
with r ∈ P, there is (admin
′,P ′,N′,r) ∈ can assign such that P ′ ⊆ P \ {r},
N′ ⊆ N ∪ {t}, and either admin
′ = admin or admin
′ = super. Then, [[ b S]]2 =
R( b S,X). This rule is summarized in Fig. 2 by R2.
Mixed Roles. A mixed role r is irrelevant, if it satisﬁes both conditions that
make non-positive and non-negative roles irrelevant. R3 of Fig. 2 captures the
removal of irrelevant mixed roles from b S. Then, [[ b S]]2 = R( b S,X), where X is the
set of all mixed roles of b S.
Removing Irrelevant Rules. We describe suﬃcient conditions to get rid of
some assignment rules. Speciﬁcally, we partition those rules in three categories:
(1) combinable which refer to pairs of rules that can be merged into a single one;
(2) implied that identify pairs of rules such that one is subsumed by the other;
(3) non-ﬁreable corresponding to can-assign rules that cannot appear in any run.
Combinable Rules. Two can-assign rules ca1, ca2 can be combined into a single
one if (1) they have the same target role, (2) their precondition sets are the same
but a single role that appears in positive form in one can-assign rule and in neg-
ative form in the other, (3) at each time either there are administrators ready to
ﬁre both rules or none of them can be executed. Those rules can be merged in a
single one where role r is removed from its precondition. Notice that this opera-
tion does not alter the set of reachable conﬁgurations since the resulting rule can
be ﬁred iﬀ one between ca1 and ca2 is ﬁreable. For instance, (super,{r1,r2},∅,r)
and (super,{r1},{r2},r) can be combined in (super,{r1},∅,r).
Formally, let ca1 = (admin1,P ∪{r},N,t) and ca2 = (admin2,P,N ∪{r},t)
∈ can assign, for some P,N. We deﬁne the predicate Combinable(ca1, ca2) that
holds true if admin1 = admin2. It is easy to see that if Combinable(ca1,ca2)
holds then ca1 and ca2 are combinable. Then, [[S]]4 =  U,R, UA,can assign′,
can revoke  where can assign′ = (can assign\{ca1 |∃ca2. Combinable(ca1,ca2)})
∪{(admin,P,N,t)|∃ca1 = (admin,P∪{r},N,t), ca2 = (admin2,P,N∪{r},t) ∈
can assign.Combinable(ca1, ca2)}. R4 of Fig. 3 summarizes this rule.R4: Let ca1 = (admin1,P ∪ {r},N,t), ca2 = (admin2,P,N ∪ {r},t) ∈ can assign
for some P,N, and admin1 = admin2. Then, replace the combinable rules ca1
and ca2 with the can-assign role ca = (admin1,P,N,t).
R5: If ca1 = (a1,P1,N1,r), ca2 = (a2,P2,N2,r) ∈ can assign, either admin1 =
super or admin1 = admin2, P1 ⊆ P2, and N1 ⊆ N2, then remove the implied
rule ca2 from S.
R6: Let ca = (admin,P,N,t) ∈ can assign and let Q = P ∩ {r |(u,r) ∈ UA} such
that ∃i ∈ [1,|Q|] and for every Z ⊆ Q with |Z| = i, there is no can-assign rule
(admin
′,P
′,N
′,r) ∈ can assign with r ∈ Z, (P
′∩Q) ⊆ Z and Z ∩N
′ = ∅, then
remove the non-ﬁreable rule ca from S.
Fig.3. Suﬃcient conditions to remove/combine assignment rules.
Implied Rules. Consider two can-assign rules ca1,ca2 with the same target
role. Then, ca1 implies ca2 if for every user u, whenever ca2 is ﬁreable on
u, then also ca1 is ﬁreable on u. E.g., the rule (super,{r1,r2},∅,r) implies
(super,{r1,r2},{r3},r). We give a suﬃcient condition to detect when ca1 implies
ca2. For every pair of rules ca1 = (admin1, P1,N1,r) and ca2 = (admin2,P2,N2,r),
we deﬁne a predicate Implies(ca1,ca2) that holds true iﬀ the following holds:
P1 ⊆ P2, N1 ⊆ N2, and either admin1 = super or admin1 = admin2. It
is easy to see that if Implies(ca1,ca2) holds, then ca1 implies ca2. Formally,
[[ b S]]5 =  U,R,UA,can assign \ X,can revoke , where X = {ca′ ∈ can assign |
∃ca ∈ can assign. Implies(ca,ca′)}. R5 of Fig. 3 captures this rule.
Non-Fireable Rules. A can-assign rule ca is non-ﬁreable if for every run π =
c1
m1 − − → ...cn
mn − − → cn+1 of b S, mi  = ca for every i ∈ [1,n]. We now give a suﬃcient
condition that allows to detect when a ca = (admin,P,N,t) is non-ﬁreable. Let
Q = P \ {r|(u,r) ∈ UA}, that is, the set of P roles that contain no member
in the initial conﬁguration of b S. Moreover, let NotFireable be a predicate over
the set of can-assign rules, such that NotFireable(ca) holds true if and only if
the following property holds: there exists i ∈ [1,|Q|] such that for every Z ⊆ Q
with |Z| = i, there is no can-assign rule (a′,P ′,N′,r) ∈ can assign with r ∈ Z,
(P ′ ∩ Q) ⊆ Z and Z ∩ N′ = ∅.
The following lemma holds:
Lemma 1. Let ca ∈ can assign. If NotFireable(ca) holds true, then can-assign
rule ca is non-ﬁreable.
[[ b S]]6 =  U,R,UA,can assign \ NF,can revoke , where NF is the set of all can-
assign ca such that NotFireable(ca) holds true. R6 of Fig. 3 captures this rule.
The correctness of all pruning rules is summarized by the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let b S be an ARBAC system. For every i ∈ {1,...,6}, (1) [[ b S]]i is
an ARBAC system, (2) goal is reachable in b S iﬀ goal is reachable in [[ b S]]i, and
(3) |[[ b S]]i| < |b S| or |[[ b S]]i| = |b S|.
AggressivePruning Algorithm takes as input an ARBAC system S and a
role goal of S and returns a system S′ obtained by repeatedly applying the
pruning rules Ri, for i ∈ {1,...,6}, along with some existing pruning rulesdescribed in [4, 22]. The algorithm eventually terminates as the application of
each pruning rule reduces or leaves unaltered the ARBAC system.
Theorem 3. Let S be an ARBAC system and S′ = AggressivePruning(S,goal).
Role goal is reachable in S′ iﬀ goal is reachable in S.
6 Experimental Results
We have implemented the procedure ReduceAdmin of Sec. 4 along with Ag-
gressivePruning of Sec. 5. Here, we evaluate both procedures on several bench-
marks from the literature. The experiments are conducted on a Macbook Pro
with an Intel Core i5 2.3 GHz processor and 4GB of RAM. The results of our
experiments are reported in Tables 1-3. The tables report the number of roles
and rules for each original ARBAC policy. Table 3, in addition reports also the
number of administrative roles and the number of users for each policy. All ta-
bles report the same information about the original policies, about the policies
obtained after the application of our procedures, as well as the time taken.
AggressivePruning evaluation on a Bank policy. The ﬁrst set of experi-
ments are conducted on a policy modeling a bank [9].
The bank comprises several branches,
ARBAC Policy After Pruning
#roles #rules #roles #rules Time
1
612 6142 0 0 3.0s
612 6142 2 1 3.0s
612 6142 2 1 3.0s
2
612 6142 0 0 2.0s
612 6142 0 0 2.0s
612 6142 2 1 2.0s
3 612 6142 468 3285 0.0s
4 612 6142 462 3272 0.1s
Table1. AggressivePruning on
the Bank Policy.
each consisting of four divisions with ﬁve
non-managerial roles and two managerial
ones. The policy is designed in a way that
in any branch a user (non-manager) can be
part of at most three non-managerial roles
out of ﬁve (see [8] for details). The policy
has 612 roles and 6142 rules.
The evaluation of our pruning proce-
dure on the bank policy is shown in Table 1
that is divided in four sets of experiments,
one for a diﬀerent security query on the policy. The ﬁrst query is: Can any user
(non-manager) be assigned to four non-managerial roles in a business division
in any of the branches? The ﬁrst experiment considers the original policy. After
a single iteration the pruning algorithm eliminates some combinable and implied
rules and ﬁnds that rules assigning users to the role goal are non-ﬁreable. For
the remaining two experiments, we introduce errors in the policy: we add can-
assign rules that allow a (non-manager) user to be part of four non-managerial
roles in one of the divisions, respectively, in a single branch (second experiment)
and in all branches (third experiment). In both cases, after some iterations that
involve all six pruning rules, the simpliﬁed system is left with the sole role goal
(beside the administrative role), and a single can-assign rule: (admin,∅,∅,goal)
witnessing that goal is reachable.
For the second set of experiments the query is: Can any user (non-manager)
be assigned to four non-managerial roles in a business division in all the branches?
As above, the ﬁrst experiment is done on the original policy, while the other two
experiments on the modiﬁed policies. In the ﬁrst and second experiment theSize Policy After Aggressive Pruning
First Suite Second Suite Third Suite
#roles #rules #roles #rules Time #roles #rules Time #roles #rules Time
3 15 1 1 0.0s 3 5 0.0s 3 5 0.0s
5 25 1 1 0.0s 1 1 0.0s 1 1 0.0s
20 100 1 1 0.0s 11 26 0.0s 11 26 0.0s
40 200 1 1 0.0s 1 1 0.0s 1 1 0.1s
200 1000 1 1 0.1s 1 1 0.1s 1 1 0.1s
500 2500 1 1 0.1s 1 1 0.1s 1 1 0.2s
4000 20000 1 1 6.0s 1 1 6.0s 1 1 6.3s
20000 80000 1 1 3m24s 1 1 3m32s 1 1 3m20s
30000 120000 1 1 8m14s 1 1 8m33s 1 1 7m47s
40000 200000 1 1 14m50s 1 1 18m7s 1 1 21m1s
Table2. AggressivePruning on Complex Policies with Separate Administration.
pruning algorithm ﬁnds out that goal is unreachable (rules assigning users to
goal are non-ﬁreable), while in the third experiment it returns a system con-
stituted by the sole role goal and a single can-assign rule: (admin,∅,∅, goal),
showing that goal is reachable.
The single experiment in the third set considers the query: Can any user
(manager included) retain permissions of four non-managerial roles in a business
division in any of the branches? While the query in the forth set is: Can any
user (manager included) retain permissions of four non-managerial roles in a
business division in all of the branches? Both queries are carried out on the
original policy and in both cases the pruning algorithm makes use of all six
rules, reducing the system approximatively by a third.
AggressivePruning evaluation on big policies. The authors of [9] created
three sets of complex test suites capturing the complexity of realistic systems.
Each suite comprises ten policies where the number of roles and rules ranges
respectively from 3 to 40k and 15 to 200k. Each suite presents diﬀerent kind
of source of complexity. Sources of complexity are parameters such as the size
of the policy and type of administrative rules. We refer to [9] for a comprehen-
sive description. We evaluate our pruning on these policies, whose results are
summarized in Table 2. In [9] it has been experimentally proven that existing
static pruning techniques [10, 22] are ineﬀective on such complex policies. In con-
trast, our aggressive pruning is extremely eﬀective making the policies orders of
magnitude smaller. In these policies R5 (implied rules) plays an essential role.
ReduceAdmin evaluation. We evaluate ReduceAdmin on two sets of re-
alistic ARBAC policies without separate administration, used in several case
studies [22, 7, 9, 21]: a hospital and a university policy [19]. Table 3 summarizes
the results of our evaluation. Besides the information of the original and the
simpliﬁed policy, we also indicate whether the role goal is reachable.
The ﬁrst set of experiments concerns the hospital policy. The ﬁrst experiment
in the table tests that a user is not a member of both the roles Receptionist and
Doctor, to avoid that a user bills the insurance company by falsely claiming to
treat a patient. The second one is meant to check that a patient is not his own
primary doctor. The third experiment checks that nurse and doctor roles are
disjoint, to avoid that a user has both the permissions of adding progress and
private notes. The last experiment tests whether a doctor is able to assign a user
to the role that groups patients with third party consent.
For the University policy, the ﬁrst experiment veriﬁes whether a user can be
an explicit member of both roles DeptChair and Dean. The second experimentARBAC Policy After ReduceAdmin Reach name #roles #rules #admin #users #roles #rules #admin #users Time
1 Hospital 12 25 6 1092 3 5 2 9 0.3s NO
Hospital 12 25 6 1092 5 9 3 19 0.0s NO
Hospital 12 25 6 1092 3 5 2 9 0.0s YES
Hospital 12 25 6 1092 6 8 3 16 0.0s YES
2
University 32 130 9 943 3 2 1 1 0.2s NO
University 32 130 9 943 1 1 1 1 0.2s YES
University 32 130 9 943 12 16 2 23 0.2s NO
University 32 130 9 943 11 13 2 21 0.2s YES
University 32 130 9 943 14 25 3 34 0.2s YES
Table3. ReduceAdmin evaluation.
checks if a user may have both privileges of Dean and DeptChair. The third ex-
periment tests whether a user can be simultaneously an explicit member of both
Undergrad and Grad roles. Finally, the last experiment veriﬁes that a user can be
simultaneously in the roles GradAdmissionsCommitte and AdmissionsOﬃcer.
Observations: Our techniques allow to signiﬁcantly reduce, not only the num-
ber of roles and rules, but also the number of administrative roles and the amount
of distinct user role-combinations. For instance, in the hospital policy, we need
to consider at most 19 users out of the initial 1092, each with at most 6 roles,
and only 2 or 3 of them need to be tracked! In the ﬁrst two experiments on the
university policy, the pruning reduces the administrative roles from 9 to 1.
These two experiments, particularly beneﬁt from the application of the pruning
rule R5 (implied rules). The pruning rules concerning the removal of positive
and negative roles play a signiﬁcant role for the fourth university experiment
and the third and the fourth hospital experiments. Such policy simpliﬁcations
allowed us to fully check the role-reachability problem for such policies by using
oﬀ-the-shelf tools. For example, we encoded the reduced policies into Boolean
programs and then used Getafix [12] that fully veriﬁed them in few seconds. We
did the same exercise with the original policies and tried several model-checking
tools for ﬁnite state systems and none of them could terminate the analysis.
7 Conclusions
We have laid out the foundations of reasoning with ARBAC policies where users
self-administer the resources, without recourse to a separate set of administra-
tors. We have identiﬁed a small model theorem for analysis of such policies,
arguing that tracking a bounded number of users suﬃces to check the policy.
Using this technical insight, we have developed heuristics to reduce an ARBAC
system and shown its eﬀectiveness in analyzing real-world policies.
The work reported by us in [4], which presents abstraction techniques aimed
at proving ARBAC policies correct is complementary to our work here which is
a precise analysis that can ﬁnd security breaches. A combination of these two
approaches into a CEGAR scheme would be interesting. The broader view that
we suggest is that security analysis of RBAC/ARBAC policies can be solved
using model-checking and abstraction techniques commonly used in program
veriﬁcation. Developing such techniques for a larger range of policies beyond
RBAC is an interesting future direction to pursue.Acknowledgements
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